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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
An undeniably stylized fact of the last 50 years is that, with a few exceptions, the
poorest countries of the world did not catch up with the industrialized nations in
any meaningful way. Although a considerable amount of research has been devoted
to the understanding of growth and development, economists have not yet found
how to make poor countries richer. Nevertheless, in this quest for growth, increasing
human capital has usually been considered as an adequate policy. In this context,
it is commonly argued that the brain drain (from poor to rich countries) makes rich
countries richer at the expense of the poor. By depriving poor countries of one
of their scarcest resources (human capital), the brain drain is seen as exacerbating
inequality across nations. The brain drain is particularly harmful if concentrated
in some occupations (such as healthcare personnel, teachers, engineers, etc.) and if
skilled migrants were mostly trained in their country of origin. A priori, it could be
argued that lowering the brain drain would reduce inequality across nations. Our
analysis reveals that a limited, but positive rate of skilled migration is likely to be
bene…cial for the poorest countries.
This paper belongs to the recent literature on the consequences of skilled emi-
gration for sending countries. The cost of the brain drain in terms of lost talented
workers can be compensated by large amounts of remittances1, skill diaspora e¤ects2
a n dr e t u r nm i g r a t i o n 3. A particular strand of the literature is even more optimistic
1Migrants’ remittances often make a signi…cant contribution to GNP and are a major source of
income in many developing countries, exceeding o¢cial development assistance and foreign direct
investment (see World Bank, 2006).
2Since Gould (1994), Rauch and Trindade (2002) or Rauch and Casella (2003), a large sociological
literature has emphasized that the creation of migrants’ diaspora facilitates the movement of goods,
factors, and ideas between the migrants’ host and home countries. Recent empirical studies have
stressed that these diaspora externalities are mostly driven by skilled migration (see Rapoport and
Kugler, 2006)
3Many theoretical works and case studies show that return migration and brain circulation are
2and shows that the brain drain has an ambiguous impact on human capital accu-
mulation in developing countries. Several authors such as Stark et al. (1998), Vidal
(1998), Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001, 2007), Stark and Wang (2002) argued
that migration prospects ex-ante foster education investments in developing coun-
tries. Ex-post, some will e¤ectively leave their country while other will stay put, thus
making it possible for a brain drain to be bene…cial to the source country. Basically, if
the ex-ante e¤ects is su¢ciently strong, the origin country may end up with a higher
level of human capital after emigration is netted out than in an autarky framework.
Is there any empirical support to this ex-ante incentive hypothesis? Their is a
great deal of anecdotal evidence that migration prospects indeed impact on people’s
decisions to invest in higher education. For example, in their survey on medical
doctors working in the UK, Kangasniemi et al. (2004) report that about 30% of
Indian doctors surveyed acknowledge that the prospect of emigration a¤ected their
e¤ort to put into studies; Commander et al. (2004) provide clear indications that
the software industry’s booming has been met with a powerful educational response,
partly related to migration prospects. Lucas (2004) argues that the choice of major
…eld of study (medicine, nursing, maritime training) among Filipino students respond
to shifts in the international demand for skilled workers.
At the aggregate level, cross-section empirical studies by Beine et al. (2001,
2007) con…rm that migration prospects have a positive and signi…cant impact on
human capital formation between 1990 and 2000. Depending on the magnitude of the
good for growth. Although the magnitude of return migration is badly known, the fact that migrants
accumulate knowledge and …nancial capital in rich countries before spending the rest of their career
in their origin country may generate bene…cial e¤ects on productivity and technology di¤usion (see
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003 and 2004). A recent and comprehensive survey of India’s software
industry stressed the importance of temporary mobility (strong evidence of a brain exchange or a
brain circulation), with 30-40% of the higher-level employees having relevant work experience in a
developed country (Commander et al., 2004).
3migration rate and initial human capital stock, the ex-post response (after migration
is netted out) can be positive or negative. Beine et al (2007) shows that the incentive
mechanisms is also obtained when using alternative brain drain measures controlling
for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country. Finally,
they also regress other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration
rates and …nd a positive e¤ect on youth literacy while the e¤ect on school enrollment
depends on the exact speci…cation used. These results are con…rmed by Faini (2003)
who …nds a positive e¤ect of tertiary emigration prospects on enrollment rates at
the secondary level, but a non signi…cant e¤ect on domestic enrollment in higher
education. He attributes his …nding to the choice by would-be migrants to pursue
their studies abroad.In a more general setting, Finally, Mariani (2005) shows that
the GDP growth rate is positively a¤ected by the skilled migration rate in countries
where the middle class is su¢ciently large.
The limit of these studies is that, due to data availability, they rely on cross-
country regressions. They may su¤er from mispeci…cation biases and fail at capturing
the unobserved heterogeneity between countries (see Islam, 1995). In addition, the
exact causality between human capital formation and skilled migration is not easy to
detect, although instrumentation techniques are generally used. The main purpose
of this paper is to generalize these aggregated studies using original panel data on
international migration and human capital, with 6 observations by country (from 1975
to 2000). We …rst test for the existence and robustness of the incentive hypothesis in
a ¯-convergence regression model of human capital accumulation. Then, we examine
whether the magnitude of the incentive mechanism varies with the country level of
development.
In Section 2, we describe our theoretical model characterizing human capital ac-
4cumulation in developing countries. We model the e¤ect of skilled migration on the
decision to educate and on the proportion of agents remaining in their country. We
demonstrate that the e¤ect of skilled migration on education is ambiguously linked
to the country level of development. On the one hand, migration prospects have a
stronger impact on the return to schooling in poor countries. On the other hand,
in poor or unequal countries, liquidity constraints are likely to limit the capacity of
people to respond to incentives. Our theoretical model also shows that it is important
to treat the probability of migration as an endogenous variable. Section 3 presents
the original panel data on skilled migration and human capital, which can be used
to test the model predictions. Section 4 gives the empirical results. To account for
the potential ”incentive e¤ect” of migration prospects on human capital formation in
the source countries, human capital is measured as the proportion of skilled among
natives, rather than among residents. Based on a cross-section ¯-convergence model,
our results provide some support in favor of a conditional convergence process. Skilled
migration prospects have a positive impact on human capital accumulation in devel-
oping countries. This incentive e¤ect is only perceptible in low-income countries. It
is not signi…cant in lower-middle, upper-middle and, unsurprisingly, in high-income
countries. Hence, the brain drain has an ambiguous impact on human capital accu-
mulation in poor countries; however, it unambiguously decreases the average level of
schooling in rich and middle-income countries. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e o r y
In this section, we describe the theoretical mechanisms underlying our empirical
model and derive the main testable predictions. We consider a developing economy
populated by two-period lived heterogeneous individuals. The proportion of educated
5workers is endogenous and a¤ects the wage rate through a static externality. Hence,
if skilled migration modi…es the proportion of educated in the labor force (used as a
proxy for the stock of human capital), it a¤ects the welfare of those left behind.
Assume a simple production function with labor in e¢ciency unit as a single
factor. Skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes. Each unskilled worker
supplies one e¢ciency unit of labor while skilled workers supply ¾>1 such units.
The production function is linear. At each period t, the gross domestic product Yt is
given by
Yt = wtLt (1)
where Lt is the total labor force in e¢ciency unit, and the wage rate per e¢ciency
unit of labor, wt = w(¼t;X t), is an increasing function of the proportion of skilled
adults, ¼t, and of country-speci…c characteristics Xt (such as public infrastructure,
governance, etc.). We have w
0 = @w
@¼ > 0 but impose no restriction on the sign
of second derivative w
00
= @w2
@2¼ 7 0, thus allowing for threshold externalities à la
Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Consequently, the social return to education (¾ + w
0
)
exceed the private return (¾).
Young individuals o¤er one unit of human capital and earn the minimal wage wt.
They have the possibility to spend a part of their income into education. There is a
single education program and individuals are heterogeneous in their ability to learn.
Agents are characterized by di¤erent education costs, with high-ability individuals
incurring a lower cost. The cost of education is expressed as a proportion of the wage
rate of teachers (considered as skilled workers). For a type-c agent, the cost is denoted
by ®tc¾wt where ®t is the non-subsidized proportion of education expenditure4.F o r
4This variable is introduced to show how local policies a¤ect human capital formation. Since we
focus on a partial equilibrium model, we disregard taxation issues, i.e. how education policies are
…nanced.
6simplicity, the variable c is distributed on [0;1] a c c o r d i n gt oau n i f o r md e n s i t y .W e
have c =0for the highest ability and c =1for the lowest ability agent.
In adulthood, individuals o¤er all their time on the labor market with heteroge-
neous abilities to produce. Unskilled adults receive wt whilst skilled workers receive
¾wt.
There is no saving so that the utility depends on the …rst and expected second-
period incomes. For simplicity, utility is log-linear and there is no time-discount rate.
We have
ut =l n ( y1;t ¡ ¹)+l n ( y2;t+1) (2)
where ¹ is the level of subsistence when young. Such a parameter is important to
model the absence of convergence between poor and rich countries. It is assumed
that wt = w(0;X t) >¹ . We assume no subsistence level in the second period of life
for mathematical convenience.
With this stylized model, we …rst characterize the closed economy equilibrium and
then examine the e¤ect of skilled emigration on welfare and economic activity.
Closed economy benchmark (subscript n). Individuals choose their educa-
tion so as to maximize their lifetime utility. The lifetime income for an uneducated
agent is
un;t =l n ( wt ¡ ¹)+l n ( wt+1): (3)
By contrast, the lifetime income for a type-c educated agent is
un;t =l n ( wt ¡ c®twt¾ ¡ ¹)+l n ( wt+1¾): (4)
Clearly, education is optimal for individuals whose education cost is low. The







where the cut-o¤ ability level cn;t is an increasing function of the local wage rate
wt but a decreasing function of the share of education supported by individual ®t
(one minus the subsidy rate). In a closed economy and given our speci…cations, the
proportion of educated is independent of the expected wage rate wt+1.N o t et h a tcn;t
increases in ¾ when ¾ is lower than 2. Let us assume ¾ 2 [1;2] in what follows. Given
the particular utility function, the exogeneity of the skill premium and the way we
introduce education costs, this hypothesis is necessary to ensure the existence of an
interior solution with a proportion of educated between 0 and 1.
The proportion of educated adults is given by the lagged proportion of young
individuals opting for education, ¼t+1 = cn;t.A s wt is a function of ¼t; our closed
economy model is compatible with the existence of poverty traps. Polarization in
incomes suggests that the world growth process departs from the predictions of the
one-sector, convex model with complete markets (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005).
The future proportion of educated depends on the current proportion through the






























Although this is not an essential feature of our model, the existence of a subsistence
level (¹) and wage externalities (w
0 > 0) can give rise to multiple steady states. With
exogenous wages or no subsistence level, the critical ability cn;t would be independent
of historical records.
8Introduction of probabilistic skilled migration (subscript q). In poor
countries, the enrollment in education is low for two possible reasons. Firstly, only
a few people can a¤ord paying the education costs; secondly, domestic returns to
education can be too small. Our closed economy model perfectly matches these two
ingredients. Let us now consider that a fraction pt of skilled workers can leave the
country at time t. For simplicity, we assume that unskilled workers have no access
to migration. This hypothesis is reasonable given the recent evolution of immigration
policies in rich countries. The data reveal huge di¤erentials in migration rates between
skilled and unskilled workers.
If cq;t¡1 denotes the proportion of young agents opting for education in a proba-





Ex-post (i.e. for a given proportion of educated, cq;t¡1), it is obvious that the
skilled emigration rate reduces ¼t. However, education is more and more considered
as a route to emigration. As candidates leave nothing to chance, migration prospects
may a¤ect the expected return to education and induce them to educate more. Then,
given quota systems and various types of requirements and restrictions imposed by
immigration authorities (such as the point systems), there is a probability that the
migration project will have to be postponed or abandoned at all stages of the im-
migration process. Individuals engaging in education investments with the prospect
of migration must therefore factor in this uncertainty. Ex-ante, the expectation of pt
can increase the proportion of young agents engaging in education, cq;t¡1; creating
the possibility of a net gain for the source country.
9To formalize this idea, let us now denote by w¤ the net-of-migration-cost wage rate
in industrialized host countries. In high-income or upper-middle-income countries
where the domestic wage rate is equal or higher than w¤, migration prospects does
not a¤ect education choices. In low-income and lower-middle-income countries, skilled
migration increase the expected return to education. For simplicity, we assume a
constant skill premium across countries and periods and consider that the sending
country is too small to a¤ect the wage rate in the North.
Young agents now educate by anticipating a probability pt+1 of emigrating to the
rich country. The expected lifetime utility for an uneducated agent is
uq;t =l n ( wt ¡ ¹)+l n ( wt+1): (6)
The expected lifetime utility for an educated agent now becomes
uq;t =l n ( wt ¡ c®twt¾ ¡ ¹)+pt+1 ln(w
¤¾)+( 1¡ pt+1)ln(wt+1¾): (7)
Clearly, education is worthwhile for individuals whose education cost is lower than
a critical value. The condition for investing in education in an economy with migration
















Clearly, if pt+1 =0or if wt+1 = w¤, we obtain the same proportion as in the closed





> 1; the critical level of ability
increases and more individuals engage in education. Formally, the proportion of















































> 0 if w
¤ >w t+1
On the contrary, when w¤ <w t (rich origin country), migration prospects do not
a¤ect education choice and we have
@cq;t
@pt+1 =0and cq;t = cn;t. The following testable
propositions emerge:
Proposition 1 In developing countries where wt+1 <w ¤,the ex-ante investment in
education is an increasing function of the skilled emigration rate. The size of the
response ambiguously depends on the country level of development. On the one hand,
the poorer the origin country (wt is low), the lower is the capacity of agents to respond
to migration prospects. On the other hand, the poorer the origin country (w¤=wt+1
is high), the higher is the incentive impact of migration on the expected return to
education. In rich countries where wt+1 ¸ w¤, skilled migration rates should not
impact on education choices.
Such a proposition can be empirically tested by regressing natives’ human capital
formation on variables interacting with emigration rates and country level of devel-
opment. As ®t and Xt also a¤ect the results in our stylized model, adding other
country-speci…c variables or …xed e¤ects also makes sense.
The need to endogenize emigration rates. Although skilled individuals form
expectations on the future probability to emigrate, this probability must be considered
as potentially endogenous. Due to immigration restrictions, suppose that the receiving
country is willing to accept a number Qt of educated immigrants at time t.T h e
immigration quota Qt represents a maximal fraction qt of the adult population at time
t. Hence, the higher the proportion of educated adults, the lower the probability that
11each of them will leave the country. Under perfect foresights, individuals anticipate
pt+1 = qt+1=cq;t which is clearly a negative function of the proportion of educated5.
Although explicit origin-based-quota systems are seldom observed in OECD countries,
this prediction is compatible with the stylized facts and empirical …ndings presented
in Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007): ceteris paribus, an increase in natives’
average level of schooling reduces the skilled emigration rate.
Endogenizing the probability of emigration in (8), the equilibrium proportion of
















which determines the ex-ante proportion of educated: cq;t = cq(wt;® t;w¤;w t+1;q t+1):
The expression for
dcq;t
dqt+1 can be obtained by applying the implicit function theorem.








Since cq;t depends on wt+1 , itself in‡uenced by ¼t+1, the above equation for ¼t+1
is also an implicit function. The endogeneity of the probability of migration has
theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, it a¤ects the global impact of
skilled migration on the remaining proportion of educated ¼t+1. Using the implicit





dqt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t+1)





The general expression is quite long and complex. As
dcq;t
dqt+1 and (1 ¡ qt+1) de-
creases in qt+1; the relationship between ¼t+1 and qt+1 is concave. When qt+1 is equal
5Note that in the case of myopic expectations (i.e. pt+1 = pt = qt=cp;t¡1), we would have the
same long-run equilibrium. The only di¤erence is that the transition path is di¤erent than under
perfect expectations.
12to zero, the closed economy solution cn;t applies. If cq;t = qt+1, the proportion of edu-
cated falls to its minimum (¼t+1 =0 ). Between these two extreme values, migration
prospects increase or decrease ¼t+1 depending on the size of the incentive e¤ect. A
bene…cial e¤ect on human capital can be obtained when the above derivative evalu-
ated at qt+1 =0is positive. In that case, there exists a range of qt+1 increasing the
proportion of remaining educated adults compared to the closed economy solution.















where w0 is the equilibrium wage rate in the closed economy.
Empirically, it implies that it is crucial to use instrumentation technique to es-
timate the e¤ect of skilled migration on the formation of human capital in origin
countries.
3 Human capital and migration data
The model prediction can be tested by regressing the ex-ante human capital invest-
ment of natives (i.e. residents + emigrants) on skilled emigration rates and country-
speci…c e¤ects. Our dependent variable will be the log-change in the proportion of
tertiary educated (individuals with post-secondary education or with more than 13
years of schooling) among natives. This requires collecting data on human capital of
residents and emigrants.
Several data sets provide the residents’ proportion of tertiary educated people in
each country. Our data are mostly based on the well-known data set built by Barro
and Lee (2001) for developing countries, and on De La Fuente and Domenech (2002)
13for OECD countries. For countries where Barro and Lee measures are missing, we
use Cohen and Soto (2001) indicators or transpose the proportion observed in the
neighboring country with the closest domestic enrollment in tertiary education. This
method is used in Docquier and Marfouk (2006) for computing residents’ human
capital stocks in 1990 and 2000. We generalize this method and build similar data
on a period ranging from 1975 to 2000 with periods of …ve years.
Regarding the education structure of emigrants, we rely on a new panel data set
presented in Defoort (2006). The methodology follows the World Bank-sponsored
study by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) which provides emigration rates by educa-
tion attainment for all countries in 1990 and 2000. The skill levels considered are
fully consistent with the ones used for capturing the human capital level. This data
set relies on two steps. First, emigration stocks by education level are computed
by aggregating census and register data collected in all OECD countries6. Second,
these stocks are expressed as percent of the native labor force born in the sending
country (including migrants themselves) with the same education attainment. Basi-
cally, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) provide estimates of the brain drain phenomenon
for 175 countries in 1990 and 195 countries in 2000. These estimates were used in
cross-country regressions supporting the incentive mechanism in Beine et al. (2007).
Defoort (2006) uses a similar methodology but, in order to overcome the limita-
tions of cross-section approaches, she extends the time series dimension to cover the
period 1975-2000 with data sampled at a …ve-year frequency. Unfortunately, census
and register data cannot be obtained from all OECD countries on such a long hori-
zon. Consequently, she has to focus on a more limited number of host countries. She
6In each OECD country, the census or national register gives the number of immigrants by
c o u n t r yo fb i r t ha n de d u c a t i o nl e v e l .
14collects census data on immigration by country of birth and by education attainment
from the 6 major receiving OECD countries, i.e. Canada, Australia, the US, the UK,
France and Germany7. Compared to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), these 6 coun-
tries represent 77 percent of the OECD skilled immigration stock in 2000. However,
for particular countries sending a small proportion of their migrants to the 6 major
destinations, the estimates can be much less reliable8.F o r e a c h o r i g i n c o u n t r y , w e
construct a reliability rate equal to the 2000 share of the 6 host nations in the skilled
emigration stock in the OECD. In our regressions, we either exclude observations
characterized by a reliability rate lower than 70 percent or use reliability rates in
weighted least squares models.
The data set reveals interesting features. Although globalization and selective
immigration policies have undoubtedly increased the number of skilled emigrants to
the OECD, the intensity of the brain drain has been extremely stable at the world
level or at the level of developing countries as a whole. This can be explained by
two important supply changes at origin: (i) the population size in developing coun-
tries has increased hugely and (ii) all countries (even the poorest ones) experienced
a remarkable rise in education attainment. As shown on Figure 1, some regions ex-
perienced an increase in the intensity of the brain drain (Central America, Eastern
Europe, South Central Asia and Sub Saharan Africa) while signi…cant decreases were
observed in other regions (notably the Middle East and Northern Africa). Regions
where the brain drain increased signi…cantly are those where education progresses
were small and conversely. This reinforces the need to endogenize the probability of
7In some cases, reasonable interpolations are required to evaluate the structure of immigration
between two national censuses. See Defoort (2006) for more details.
8For example, this is typically the case of Surinam sending most of their migrants to the Nether-
lands.
15migration in regressions.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Panel data analysis
Our empirical investigation relies on the standard framework of convergence models.
In particular, we will analyze the dynamics of human capital accumulation in all
countries and evaluate the role of migration of skilled workers. To account for the
potential incentive e¤ect of migration prospects on human capital formation, we
measure human capital as the proportion of high-skill natives, rather than high-skill
residents. We disregard the country where education was acquired. This assumption
is primarly guided by the data: international migrants are de…ned on the basis of
their country of birth, wherever they were trained. This contrasts with Rosenzweig
16(2007) who emphasizes the e¤ect of migration prospects on student migration. The
outsourcing of education is followed by subsequent returns, which are potentially
bene…cial for poor countries.
Our model combines the time series dimension and the cross section variation
of the data. Beyond the mere advantage of using much more observations, there
are a set of reasons that justify the use of a panel data approach rather than a
pure cross-section analysis. First, as well documented by Islam (1995) for income
levels, cross section results are subject to important mispeci…cation biases. Failure to
control for the factors that in‡uence the human capital accumulation process leads
to omitted-variable biases as these factors are likely to be correlated with the initial
level of human capital. While the migration rates of skilled workers might be one of
these factors, a number of unobservable factors are likely to in‡uence human capital
accumulation.9 Assuming that these factors are constant over time, a panel data
analysis can take that into account through the introduction of country speci…c e¤ects
capturing part of the unobserved heterogeneity. The fact that the introduction of
…xed e¤ects accounts only for the time-invariant unobservable factors is much less
limitative that it seems at …rst glance. First, a lot of factors such as ethnic diversity
or degree of urbanization are relatively stable over time. Second, other factors such
as the cost of education or the quality of institutions exhibit a lot of inertia over time.
It is thus unclear whether their explicit inclusion (should we have observations for
these factors) in the regression model would improve signi…cantly the quality of …t
and would reduce the degree of misspeci…cation bias.
Second, extending the analysis to a panel dimension allows to account for the
9For instance, it is not possible to introduce education expenditures in the panel data analysis
due to the high number of missing information in most countries for a lot of years.
17e¤ect of shocks to human capital accumulation common to all countries. This is
indeed important for human capital levels since education levels have obviously im-
proved around the world along with increased globalization. Third, as for the role of
migration, a pure cross section analysis would implicitly assume a constant rate of
emigration of skilled workers for each country. This is obviously a strong assumption.
The regression model. Our regression model is based on a convergence equation
with migration rates of skilled workers in‡uencing the long-run levels of human capital
among natives. We regress the average annual growth rate of natives’ human capital
on the skilled migration rate and on the initial level of human capital, …rst allowing












i;t + ¯ ln(hi;t¡1)+²i;t (11)
where hi;t denotes the level of human capital of natives for country i at time t (similar
notations hold for the migration rates), ®i is the country-speci…c …xed e¤ect capturing
the in‡uence on the long-run level of human capital of country-speci…c factors that
are constant over time, ±t captures the impact of common shocks across countries
speci…c to year t10, mr
i;t and md
i;t are the migration rate of skilled workers coming from
respectively rich and developing countries (following the World Bank classi…cation),
¯ is a parameter measuring the speed of convergence to the long-run level of human
capital.
As a benchmark, this equation is estimated using …xed (time and individual)
e¤ects on our samples.11 For the sake of robustness, we also consider alternative
10It should be emphasized that the estimates of ±t are all highly signi…cant at the 1% level. They
suggest that the growth rate of human capital was on average increasing over time.
11Hausman tests (not reported here to save space) strongly reject the inclusion of random e¤ects.
Furthermore, from a conceptual point of view, the use of random e¤ects does not make much sense
since we include almost all the countries of the world.
18techniques that account for speci…c methodological issues at stake here.
First, equation (11) is dynamic in the sense that ln(hi;t¡1) enters as an explanatory
variable. The use of …xed e¤ects and AR terms leads to inconsistency of estimates,
especially when the number of periods is increasing (Nickell, 1981). Although the ratio
of the cross-section dimension to the time dimension suggests that the Nickell bias
should be limited in our regressions, it is interesting to look at alternative approaches.
This is especially important here given the seemingly high rate of convergence we get
with the …xed e¤ects speci…cation. One way to overcome this problem is to use
instrumental variable estimation. To this aim, we estimate the model using GMM
regressions12 to assess the robustness of the results.
Under the null that ¯ =0(unit root hypothesis), the t-ratio statistic will be
asymptotically normally distributed for …xed T and N !1 .F o r … n i t e N,t h e
distribution might not be non standard and formal unit root tests might be required.
Since our focus is not on a speci…c test of the unit root hypothesis and the interest lies
in the e¤ect of migration rates on the long-run values of human capital, we estimate
equation (11) using standard techniques such as FGLS or GMM. Furthermore, the
size of the t-ratios obtained for ¯ suggests that the case for a unit root is quite low.
As abundantly discussed in the theoretical framework, a second problem concerns
the endogeneity of migrations rates of skilled workers (mr
i;t and md
i;t) with respect
to the change in the human capital level. Basically, one can expect that migration
rates will be lower in countries in which the increase in the level of education has
been relatively stronger. Failure to account for some potential reverse causality is
likely to result in biased estimates of the parameters in general, and of °r and °d in
particular. To account for that, we use instrumental variable estimation to estimate
12See Arrelano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), or Blundel and Bond (1992).
19equation (11). More precisely, we use lagged values of mr
i;t and md
i;t as instruments
of the migration rates. First stage regressions show that mr
i;t¡1 and md
i;t¡1 are strong
predictors of current migration rates with t-statistics above 9 and 10 respectively.
Finally, we also address the issue of the reliability of the sample. As discussed
above, our panel data set is based on migration data collected in 6 major receiving
countries. Our data capture a fraction of the skilled emigration to the OECD. Basi-
cally, the lower the proportion of migrants to OECD countries, the lower is the degree
of reliability of the migration data. In a …rst step, we eliminate countries sending
less than 70% of their skilled migrants to the 6 main destinations, which leads to a
signi…cant loss of information. In a second step, we also use weighted FE estimation
in which the regression weights are given by the 2000 proportion of skilled migrants
captured in our sample. This allows to include more than 20 additional countries in
the regression sample.
Table 1 provides the estimation results of equation (11) using the four di¤erent
approaches explained above. Column (1) reports the estimates with the …xed ef-
fect estimation. Column (2) gives the results using the GMM estimation procedure.
Columns (3) and (4) provide the instrumental variable estimation results, for the full
model and the parsimonious one. Column (5) gives the parameter estimates with the
weighted …xed e¤ect estimation procedure. Finally, Column (6) gives estimates for
the random-e¤ects (RE) model.
20Table 1: Human capital and migration prospects: panel data results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -.138*** -.082*** -.123*** -062*** -.136*** -.003
(0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0:017) (0.008)
¯ -.111*** -.074*** -.117*** -.118*** -.110*** -.013***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001)
°r 0.071 0.079 0.172 - 0.070 0.018
(0.073) (0.068) (0.276) - (0.056) (0.019)
°d 0.060** 0.108** 0.148** 0.147* 0.058** 0.015*
(0.027) (0.044) (0.068) (0.068) (0.027) (0.009)
Nb. obs. 735 735 588 588 855 735
Nb. countries 147 147 147 147 171 147
R2 0.6145 - 0.5552 0.5561 0.6064 0.0943
Note: Estimated equation (11). Fixed e¤ects ®i and ±t not reported. P-value: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. In column (1), …xed-e¤ects (FE) estimates are included. In column
(2), the GMM procedure is used to account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent
variable. Columns (3) reports the instrumental variable estimation with emigration rates
instrumented by their lagged values. Column (4) gives the parsimonious version of column
(3). Column (5) gives the FE estimates with regression weighted by the proportion of
OECD migrants captured in the data set. Column (6) gives estimates for the random-
e¤ects (RE) model. Note that the Hausman test stongly rejects the RE speci…cation. The
Hansen/Sargan J test (not reported here) supports the validity of the instruments in GMM
regressions. Note that since we have no overidenti…cation degree in IV regressions, the
Hansen/Sargan J test is not conducted for IV estimates. Nevertheless, the Anderson test
supports the relevance of lagged migration rates as instruments in IV regressions.
Results of Table 1 suggest that our …ndings are robust to the use of alternative
methods and approaches. These …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, our
results suggest that a catching-up process in terms of education level has taken place
over the investigation period. The coe¢cient relative to the initial value of human
capital is always highly signi…cant. Furthermore, the implied speed of convergence
(towards the country-speci…c steady state) is quite homogeneous across regressions.
It ranges from 15% to 20% per year.
Second, the results suggest that the emigration of skilled workers from developing
to rich countries tends to exert a positive impact on the long-run level of human
21capital of these countries. The coe¢cient of md
i;t is always signi…cantly positive in
all regressions. This means that the obtained incentive e¤ect is robust to the use of
alternative regression methods. The IV method is nevertheless the only one coping
explicitely with the possible endogeneity of migration rates. Therefore, we will use
the IV method in subsequent regressions allowing for various schemes of country
classi…cation.
Although Table 1 suggests that the results are qualitatively similar caross regres-
sion techniques, the value of the estimated coe¢cient of md
i;t does vary quite signi…-
cantly. The size of the incentive e¤ect is found to be quite higher with IV estimates
compared to …xed e¤ect of GMM estimates. This suggests that accounting for the
endogeneity of migration rates is important for the assesment of the incentive e¤ect
in poor countries. The di¤erences between the estimated coe¢cients of md
i;t raises
the question of the forecastibility of the models. To address this issue, we proceed
for all estimated models to in-sample simulations of the human capital level. Using
estimates of Table 1 and on the basis of the initial value of the human capital level
(observed in 1975), we start from the observations for hi;1975 (human capital levels in
1975) anduse (11) to forecast the values in 2000. Figure 2 plots the observed human
capital distribution in 2000 with the simulated one for the four alternative regression
techniques (FE, GMM, IV and RE). The …rst three regression techniques that rely
on …xed e¤ects lead to extremely similar forecasts which are relatively close to the
observations. This contrasts with the RE e¤ects model that leads to poor forecast of
the HK distribution. This is consistent with the results of the Hausman test which
tends to favour the use of …xed rather than random e¤ects.
22Figure 2: In-sample simulation of the human capital distribution in 2000
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
HC_observed HC_FE HC_GMM HC_IV HC_RE
HC_observed = observed distribution of human capital in 2000; .HC_FE = simulated
distribution with …xed e¤ects; HC_GMM = simulation with GMM; HC_IV = simulation
with IV method; ; HC_RE = simulation with random e¤ects.
Note that the decrease in the signi…cance level of °d in columns (3)-(4) is due
to a blow-up of the standard error of the parameter rather than a decrease in the
value of the coe¢cient. This is a well-known e¤ect due to the use of two-stage proce-
dures like the instrumental variable method used in this regression. Unsurprisingly,
the coe¢cient of migration rate for rich countries (°r) is never signi…cant at usual
con…dence levels. These results are consistent with the incentive hypothesis of skilled
migration for developing countries explained in a couple of theoretical and empirical
papers (Beine et al., 2001 and 2007, Stark et al., 1997, 1998, Stark and Wang, 2002).
23Analysis by country group. Our theoretical model clearly shows that the
size of the incentive e¤ect depends on the level of development. Although the cross-
section results in Beine et al (2007) do not provide any evidence of a di¤erent impact
for the poorest countries, it is worth allowing for such di¤erentials in a panel setting.
In order to allow for di¤erent incentive impacts across types of countries, we make
explicit distinction between rich, intermediate and poor countries. In this respect,
we use some combination of the classi…cations provided by the World Bank. In the
benchmark classi…cation used in the general model (called classi…cation 1), we include
in the rich group nations de…ned as high-income countries by the World Bank. The
remaining countries are included in the group of developing countries. The other
classi…cations are generated by combining the 4 initial groups de…ned by the World
Bank into sub-groups, i.e. high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income
and low-income countries. Distinguishing groups instead of interacting the emigration
rate with the GDP per capita level avoids strong problems of endogeneity but also
implausible assumptions on the conditional e¤ect of migration. Table 2 provides the
de…nition of the classi…cations.
24Table 2: De…nition of country groups
World Bank
Classi…cation Our groups High-income Upper-mid Lower-mid Low-income
1 Rich *














Correspondence between our groups and the World Bank 2000 classi…cation.
The results provided in Table 3 highly depend on the chosen classi…cation of
sending countries. Therefore, it is desirable to check the robustness of the results
to alternative classi…cation schemes. A further breakdown of the group of the less
developed countries might also be interesting. Such a breakdown could show which
type(s) of countries tend to drive the positive impact of migration of skilled workers
in terms of education. To this aim, we run the same regression procedure as the one
conducted in Table 1 but with alternative classi…cations. We use IV estimation in
order to rule out any bias due to reverse causality. All …rst-stage regression results
(not reported here to save space) show that the lagged values of skilled migration
rates are strong instruments of the current rates. Column (1) of Table 3 reports the
initial results with the benchmark classi…cation. Columns (2) to (5) report the results
obtained with classi…cations 2, 3, 4 and 5 as de…ned in Table 2.
25Table 3: Di¤erenciating the e¤ects by country group
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -.062*** -.066*** -.064*** -.064*** 0.064***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
¯ -.117*** -.122*** -.118*** -.118*** -.118***
(0:008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
°r 0.172 0.159 0.147 -.011 -.146
(0.321) (0.320) (0.328) (0.190) (0.329)
°d 0.148** - - - -
(0.079)
°i - -.066 -.054 -.049
(0.217) (0.129) (0.150)
°i+ - - - - -.062
(0.223)
°i¡ - - - - -.050
(0.150)
°p - 0.187** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.304***
(0:081) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Nb. obs. 588 588 588 588 588
Nb. countries 147 147 147 147 147
R2 0.5552 0.5592 0.5388 0.5382 0.5390
Note: Estimated equation (11) in which developing countries are split according to
Table 2. Fixed e¤ects ®i and ±t not reported. P-value: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All
regressions are estimated with instrumental variables. Lagged values of emigration rates are
used as instruments of current values
Results reported in Table 3 provide a strikingly similar picture as the one given
before. The results support the catching-up hypothesis and deliver similar speeds
of convergence. Concerning the in‡uence of migration rates on long-run levels of
human capital, the results allow to re…ne the previous interpretation. It is seen that
the positive incentive impact of migration rates of skilled workers is driven by the
e¤ects peculiar to the poorest countries. Results obtained with classi…cations (3) to
(5) in which low-income countries (de…ned as in the World Bank claissi…cation) are
isolated, show that migration rates of poor countries exert strong, robust and positive
e¤ects in terms of human capital accumulation. In column (2), this result still holds
26when lower-middle-income countries are associated to low-income countries, but the
coe¢cient is much lower and less signi…cant. Once again, this is consistent with the
idea that the incentive e¤ect concerns mainly the poorest countries.
We conclude that a strong incentive e¤ect is at work in low-income countries. By
increasing the expected return to education, migration prospects foster the number of
natives investing in human capital. In poor countries, such an incentive e¤ect makes
the global impact of the brain drain on human capital ambiguous. In the middle-
income and rich countries, we …nd no evidence of a positive incentive e¤ect. The brain
drain then unambiguously reduces the stock of human capital in these countries.
5 Who are the potential winners?
Our empirical analysis reveals that skilled migration prospects foster human capital
formation of natives originating from low-income countries. As some of them will
leave (or never return after being trained abroad), the net e¤ect on the quantity of
human capital remaining in the country is ambiguous. A brain gain can be obtained if
skilled emigration rates are not too high. To evaluate the global impact of migration
prospects on human capital, let us use equation (11) and compute the steady state
proportion of native educated as a function of …xed e¤ects and the skilled emigration
rate. We have
hi;ss =e x p
·







i;ss are the …xed e¤ects and skilled emigration rates observed in 2000
(superscript p stands for low-income countries).
Then, we compute the e¤ect on residents’ human capital (Hi;ss) by dropping
27emigrants from the native population:
Hi;ss =
(1 ¡ mi;ss)hi;ss
1 ¡ mi;sshi;ss ¡ mi;ss(1 ¡ hi;ss)
where mi;ss is the rate of migration of the unskilled.
Given the parameter set (®;®i;°p), Figure 3 presents the simulated impact of
skilled emigration rates and country-speci…c …xed e¤ects on the long-run proportion
of educated in poor countries. The simulation is based on the following assumptions:
mi;ss = mi;ss=10 (in poor countries, skilled migration rates are on average ten times
as high as unskilled migration rates) and ±ss = ±2000. W el e tt h ec o u n t r y - s p e c i … c
…xed e¤ect vary between -.6 and -.3, which is the range of values obtained in poor
countries.
It clearly appears that the …xed e¤ect has a strong impact on the long-run level of
human capital, especially for low skilled emigration rates. This result is not surprising
as …xed e¤ects captures many determinants of human capital formation such as ed-
ucation policies, returns to skills, governance, ethnic discrimnation, etc. The skilled
emigration induces an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on the long-run stock of human capi-
tal. The latter result is highly compatible with the theoretical model depicted above.
We observe that moderate skilled emigration rates have a small but positive impact
on human capital. However, when the emigration rate exceeds 50 percent, the human
capital loss increases exponentially compared to the closed economy benchmark. The
”optimal” migration rate (i.e. maximizing residents’ human capital) is around 20 per-
cent in countries where the …xed e¤ect is very low and around 30 percent in countries
where the …xed e¤ect is not too low. The brain drain is lower than 20-30 percent in
many low-income countries, except in the smallest states. Our results suggest that
most low-income countries could experience a net brain gain.
28Figure 3: Skilled emigration rates, …xed e¤ects and residents’ human



























In poor countries, …xed e¤ects range from -0.6 to -0.3. Simulation are based on
classi…cation 3 in Table 2, and column (3) in Table 3.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The new growth literature has stressed the role of human capital for economic de-
velopment. Hence, the emigration of skilled workers is usually blamed for depriving
developing countries of their most talented workers. This view has been challenged
by a new literature putting forward multiple positive feedback e¤ects for sending
countries. However, the empirical literature on the consequences of the brain drain
remains quite poor. In particular, several contributions demonstrate that skilled
migration prospects can increase human capital accumulation ex-ante, possibly turn-
29ing the brain drain into a brain gain. Due to data limitations, existing empirical
studies are based on cross-sectional regressions and su¤er from the bias of omitted
variables/unobserved heterogeneity, and the di¢culty to solve potential endogeneity
problems.
Taking advantage of a new panel data set of emigration rates by education level,
this paper con…rms the existence of a strong incentive mechanism when unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are serioulsy addressed. In addition, it comes
out that such an incentive e¤ect is only perceptible among low-income countries
for which migration premia are high. In middle-income and rich countries, migration
prospects have no signi…cant impact on education decisions so that skilled emigration
rates directly re‡ect their loss of human capital. In poor countries, the net e¤ect of
the brain drain on human capital is positive when the brain drain is not too high
(say lower than 30 percent). This is the case of many countries, except the smallest
states. When the emigration rate exceeds that threshold, the cost of the brain drain
increases exponentially.
Many questions and sources of uncertainty remain in the literature on the conse-
quences of the brain drain. Where did migrants acquire education? Can the outsourc-
ing of education explain the positive correlation between emigration rates and human
capital investments? Does the outsourcing of education lead to important return ‡ows
of educated migrants? Is the incentive e¤ect depending on the destination? Does the
brain drain induce severe occupational shortage? In our regressions, many of these
factors (outsourcing of education, return migration, etc) are likely to be assimilated to
pure incentive mechanisms. It would be helpful to build new micro surveys explicitly
conducted to capture the relationship between emigrants and their country of origin,
to collect more data and case-studies on the sectoral impact of the brain drain, to
30improve the quality of human capital indicators of residents. However, within the
limits of a macroeconomic approach, our analysis provides an additional argument
in favor of the incentive mechanism. A global research agenda based on multi-level
studies (combining country cases, micro and macro studies) would be needed to re…ne
the nature of the e¤ect captured in our regressions.
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